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Using the stem completion task, we compared estimates of automatic retrieval from an
implicit memory task, the process dissociation procedure, and the speeded response procedure.
Two standard manipulations were employed. In Experiment 1, a depth of processing effect was
found on automatic retrieval using the speeded response procedure although this effect was
substantially reduced in Experiment 2 when lexical processing was required of all words. In
Experiment 3, the speeded response procedure showed an advantage of full versus divided
attention at study on automatic retrieval. An implicit condition showed parallel effects in each
study, suggesting that implicit stem completion may normally provide a good estimate of
automatic retrieval. Also, we replicated earlier findings from the process dissociation proce-
dure, but estimates of automatic retrieval from this procedure were consistently lower than
those from the speeded response procedure, except when conscious retrieval was relatively
low. We discuss several factors that may contribute to the conflicting outcomes, including
the evidence for theoretical assumptions and criterial task differences between implicit and
explicit tests.
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Several procedures have been developed in an attempt to identify the contribu-
tions to memory performance of automatic retrieval processes—retrieval of previ-
ously studied information with no intent to do so. These include implicit memory
tasks (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987), the retrieval intentionality criterion
(Schacter, Bowers, & Booker, 1989), and the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby,
1991, 1998). The utility of each has been challenged on several grounds. For exam-
ple, Jacoby (1991) and Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork (1988) noted that parallel ef-
fects of variables on implicit and explicit tests may indicate contamination of implicit
performance with conscious retrieval. In terms of the retrieval intentionality crite-
rion, Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, and Java (1996) argued that conscious retrie-
val is not a necessary consequence of awareness of the episodic history of an item
(Graf & Komatsu, 1994; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). Finally, some of the theo-
retical assumptions of the process dissociation procedure have been questioned (e.g.,
Bodner, Masson, & Caldwell, 2000; Horton, Wilson, & Evans, 2001; Joordens &
Merikle, 1993; Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1996).
Horton et al. (2001; Vonk & Horton, in press; Wilson & Horton, 2002) described
an alternative procedure that uses RTs to identify retrieval strategy. The speeded re-
sponse procedure is based on the assumption that automatic retrieval executes faster
than conscious retrieval (de Houwer, 1997; Reingold & Toth, 1996; Richardson-Kla-
vehn & Gardiner, 1995, 1996, 1998; Toth, 1996; Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, Krüger, &
Bredenkamp, 2002; Weldon & Jackson-Barrett, 1993; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994),
and we have reported data to support this assumption (Horton et al., 2001; Wilson
& Horton, 2002). Following a study task, subjects in a speeded response group first
received practice stem completion tests in which none of the stems corresponded to
studied items. Their instructions were to respond as quickly as possible with the first
word that came to mind. To increase response speed, average RTs were presented to
subjects at the end of each test and faster responding was encouraged on the subse-
quent test. Because subjects were encouraged to respond quickly and no stems cor-
responded to the studied items, subjects had no basis for adopting conscious retrieval
on the practice tests. These design features were implemented to maximize the like-
lihood that conscious retrieval strategies would be excluded. The critical stem com-
pletion tests immediately followed the practice tests with the only difference being
that, on the critical test, 50% of the stems corresponded to studied items. Although
it would be possible to switch to conscious retrieval on the critical tests, a compar-
ison of speeded response group RTs with those from a baseline group and an explicit
group argued against that conclusion.
Subjects in the baseline group performed exactly the same tasks as subjects in the
speeded response group except that none of the stems on the critical test corre-
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speeded response group except that, immediately prior to the critical test, they were
instructed to switch to a conscious retrieval strategy. That is, they were to use the
stems to retrieve previously studied items while still responding as quickly as possi-
ble. The RTs on the critical test for the explicit group were longer than those of
either the speeded response or the baseline group, which did not differ. Longer
RTs for the explicit group compared to the baseline group are consistent with the
assumption that conscious retrieval is slower than automatic retrieval (Richard-
son-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995, 1996, 1998; Toth, 1996; Vaterrodt-Plünnecke
et al., 2002). Critically, these findings also indicate that the speeded response group
did not switch to a conscious retrieval strategy on the critical test.
In the present research, we extended this work to include a direct comparison of
automatic estimates from the speeded response group with those from standard im-
plicit and PDP groups. Depth of processing was manipulated in Experiments 1 and 2
and full/divided attention was manipulated in Experiment 3. A comparison of per-
formance in the implicit condition with that of the speeded response group would
indicate whether the standard implicit stem completion task is routinely contami-
nated with explicit retrieval. Similar automatic estimates in the speeded response
and PDP conditions would provide converging evidence for the critical assumptions
of these two measures of automatic retrieval.2. Experiment 1
In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a depth of processing manipulation to compare
estimates of automatic retrieval across implicit memory, PDP, and speeded response
conditions. The stem completion task was used at test, as this has been frequently
used in both implicit memory and PDP studies, and is particularly amenable to
the speeded response task (Horton et al., 2001). In studies of implicit memory, dee-
per levels of processing invariably leads to greater priming, although these effects are
not always reliable (Brown & Mitchell, 1994; Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Newell &
Andrews, 2004). By contrast, depth of processing consistently has no effect on the
automatic component using PDP analysis (e.g., Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, Toth, &
Yonelinas, 1993).
We speculated that depth might have parallel effects on the automatic and con-
scious components of retrieval but that the effect on the automatic component
was masked using PDP (Russo, Cullis, & Parkin, 1998). The logic for this hypothesis
was twofold. First, PDP is based on the assumption that automatic and conscious
retrieval are independent, which requires
pðAjCÞ ¼ pðAÞ ¼ pðAjCÞ
where A refers to automatic retrieval and C refers to conscious retrieval. However, if
automatic and conscious retrieval are positively correlated (Curran & Hintzman,
1995, 1997; Hintzman & Curran, 1997; Joordens & Merikle, 1993; Wilson & Horton,
2002; but see Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 1997; Jacoby & Shrout, 1997), then use of the
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an underestimate of A. Accordingly, PDP could lead to inaccurate conclusions about
the effects of manipulations on automatic retrieval, particularly when the uncondi-
tional probability C is relatively high (Wilson & Horton, 2002). By contrast, if the
independence assumption is correct, then A is accurately estimated by AjC. Second,
deeper processing could enhance automatic retrieval of the item, in addition to its
effect on conscious retrieval. Such a finding is suggested by performance on implicit
memory tasks, although performance on these tasks may be contaminated by con-
scious retrieval. Given that our speeded task invokes relatively pure automatic retrie-
val (Horton et al., 2001; Wilson & Horton, 2002), we can identify contamination
from conscious retrieval on implicit tasks by directly comparing target completion
rates in our speeded task with those in an implicit task. Contamination would be evi-
denced by higher target completion rates in an implicit task compared to the speeded
group (Horton et al., 2001).
Experiment 1 included four groups: speeded response, implicit, inclusion, and
exclusion. The speeded response group received three practice stem completion tests
to maximize the likelihood of subjects generating completions based strictly on auto-
matic retrieval in the critical test. The implicit group completed filler tasks prior to
the critical stem completion task. The inclusion and exclusion groups also completed
the filler tasks prior to completing word stems under either inclusion or exclusion
instructions. Although inclusion and exclusion tasks have traditionally been given
to the same subjects (for exceptions, see Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Hirshman,
Fisher, Henthorn, Arndt, & Passannante, 2003; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1993;
Russo & Andrade, 1995; Vaterrodt-Plünnecke et al., 2002), we opted for a be-
tween-subjects design to minimize concerns of subjects becoming confused about
the tasks (Bodner et al., 2000; Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, 1995;
Curran & Hintzman, 1995; Graf & Komatsu, 1994).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Subjects
A total of 60 university undergraduates participated in this research, either for
bonus credit in their Introductory Psychology course or for $6. None of the students
had previously participated in a similar study. Twelve students were randomly as-
signed to each group except that 24 students were assigned to the speeded response
group. Some additional tests were conducted with subjects in the latter group after
they had completed all aspects of the procedure described here. Because they did not
differ on the tasks described here, we treat them as one group of 24 subjects. All sub-
jects were tested individually.
2.1.2. Design
The design was a 4 · 2 · 4 mixed factorial, with group (implicit, speeded response,
inclusion, exclusion) as a between-subjects variable, and depth of processing (seman-
tic, nonsemantic) and test (three practice tests, critical test) as within-subjects
variables.
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A total of 128 words were selected from the same source as used in Horton et al.
(2001). The words were responses to 3-letter stems given by subjects who had not
studied any words previously. The probability of generating the words varied from
0.05 to 0.20. All stems had several possible solutions but were unique within the list.
Proper nouns and unusual or complex spellings were avoided.
Of these words, 72 served as practice word stems, 48 served as critical items, and 8
were buffer items in the study phase. The 48 critical items were randomly assigned to
two lists of 24 items each. Half the subjects in each group studied each list. Of the 24
critical words in each list, 12 were studied in each of the semantic and nonsemantic
orienting tasks. Over the course of the experiment, each item was studied equally
often with each orienting task. The two orienting tasks were presented in randomized
blocks in each study list. Four buffer items (two semantic, two nonsemantic) were
presented at the beginning and the end of the study list, resulting in a total of 32
items in each list. Participants were exposed to all 48 critical stems on the critical test.
2.1.4. Procedure
Subjects were told that we were examining performance on a variety of tasks.
During the study phase, all subjects studied half the words in the context of semantic
orienting instructions and half in the context of nonsemantic orienting instructions
using a block randomized order. In the semantic condition, subjects generated an
associate for the word and verbalized that word to the experimenter. In the nonse-
mantic condition, subjects counted the number of consonants in each word and ver-
balized the number. The orienting instruction was presented in the top left corner of
the computer screen and the target word was presented in the middle of the screen.
The study trial was self-paced.
Following the study phase, subjects in the implicit group completed two filler
tasks which required approximately the same length of time as the practice stem
completion tasks given to other groups. Following the filler tasks, subjects completed
the critical stem completion task under standard implicit memory instructions. Each
stem appeared on the screen with instructions to verbalize the first word that came to
mind that could complete the stem. Consistent with instructions used in other studies
of implicit memory, there was not the emphasis on responding very quickly that
there was in the speeded response group. Instructions for the stem completion task
made no reference to the prior study trial.
Subjects in the inclusion and exclusion groups also completed the filler tasks imme-
diately after the study trial and were then given instructions for the critical test.
Instructions for the inclusion task indicated that approximately half the stems corre-
sponded to studied words and that subjects were to use each stem to think of a studied
word. If they could not think of a studied word, they provided the first word that
came to mind. Subjects responded orally and the experimenter typed the response into
the computer. Instructions for the exclusion task were similar to those for the inclu-
sion task except for the emphasis on not responding with previously studied words.
Subjects in the speeded response group were given three practice tests followed by
the critical test. The practice tests contained 12, 24, and 36 word stems, respectively.
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responses were being timed via a voice-activated relay. At the end of each practice
test, the computer displayed the mean RT for that test and all previous practice tests.
Throughout the practice tests, subjects were continually encouraged to increase their
speed of responding. The critical test was presented immediately after the third prac-
tice test and was treated no differently by the experimenter than the practice tests.
Responses to all stems were typed into the computer by the experimenter. No refer-
ence was made to the study phase at any stage during the stem completion tests.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Response times
The RT data for the speeded response group appear in Table 1. Analysis of RTs
on the three practice tests plus the nonstudied items on the critical test revealed a reli-
able effect, F(3,69) = 8.57, MSE = 13365. The RTs on the first test were significantly
longer than those on each of the subsequent tests (LSD = 67 ms), but there were no
differences among RTs on the final two practice tests and the critical test. A further
analysis of the RT data on the final practice test and the nonstudied items on the
critical test revealed no difference, t(23) = 0.74, SEM = 28.17. A power analysis
was completed on these data in order to substantiate the conclusion that subjects
in the speeded response group did not switch to a conscious retrieval strategy on
the critical stem completion test. Horton et al. (2001) reported a RT difference of
1488 ms between the speeded response and baseline groups. We elected to use half
that difference to assess the power of this test, recognizing that subjects must first be-
come aware that they are generating studied items on the critical test before they can
be expected to switch to a conscious strategy. Assuming a difference of 744 ms, the
power of this test is greater than 0.99 (d = 3.81). A difference of 180 ms is required toTable 1















Expt. 1 1027 891 879 930 908 885
(60) (49) (56) (59) (62) (44)
Expt. 1A 964 913 – 915 837 881
(66) (53) (71) (48) (68)
Expt. 2 991 – – 811 654 639
(66) (67) (31) (31)
Expt. 3 891 803 785 751 678 757
(43) (26) (28) (35) (29) (27)
Note: There were two practice tests in Experiment 1A and one in Experiment 2. Response times for the
studied and nonstudied items on the critical stem completion test are shown separately. The semantic/
nonsemantic manipulation was used in Experiments 1, 1A, and 2, and the full/divided attention manip-
ulation was used in Experiment 3. Standard errors in parentheses.
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the results of Horton et al., RTs for the speeded response group showed no evidence
that subjects switched to a conscious retrieval strategy on the critical test, despite the
presentation of stems from studied items on that test.
We analyzed RTs to stems for which the critical words were generated. Four sub-
jects were deleted from this analysis because they failed to generate at least two tar-
get items on the critical test in one or both encoding conditions. The results appear in
Table 1. There was no depth of processing effect, F < 1, although it may be noted
that relatively few items were used in calculating these RTs for individual subjects,
resulting in a large error term. This may account for the different statistical outcome
here compared to that reported in Horton et al. (2001).
2.2.2. Stem completion
Based on the conclusion that responses of the speeded response group on the crit-
ical test reflect pure automatic retrieval, we can compare target completion rates of
the implicit group with those of the speeded response group to determine if there is
evidence that the implicit group also engaged in pure automatic retrieval. If target
completion rates are similar, then it is reasonable to conclude that the implicit group
did not use conscious retrieval. Higher target completion rates in the implicit group
would suggest that their performance was contaminated by conscious retrieval. Sim-
ilarly, automatic estimates from the inclusion and exclusion groups can be compared
with those from the speeded response group to determine whether the PDP analysis
provides good estimates of automatic retrieval. Baseline scores for the implicit group
(0.13) and the speeded response group (0.14) did not differ, F < 1.
Target completion rates for the implicit and speeded response groups on the crit-
ical stem completion test appear in Table 2. Analysis of these data revealed no effect
of group, F < 1, and no interaction of group · depth of processing, F(1,34) = 1.18,
MSE = 0.01, indicating equivalent priming in the implicit and speeded response
groups. Because the lack of difference between these two groups could be the result
of a Type II error, we determined the power of a 2-tailed test (a = 0.05) to detect a
difference as large as that between the target completion rates in the implicit and
inclusion groups (0.11). Using procedures described by Cohen (1988, Example
2.4), with n 0 = 16 and d = 0.718, power was approximately 0.76. There was a signif-
icant depth of processing effect, F(1,34) = 15.58, with higher target completion rates
in the semantic than in the nonsemantic condition. This replicates the findings of
Horton et al. (2001) and thus confirms that depth effects may be evidenced with auto-
matic retrieval. The equivalent performance of the speeded response and the implicit
groups suggests that the implicit group relied on automatic retrieval on the critical
test and showed no evidence of contamination from conscious retrieval processes.
2.2.3. Analysis of PDP group data
Analysis of baseline scores revealed no reliable differences between the inclusion
(0.18) and exclusion (0.14) groups, F(1,22) = 1.45, MSE = 0.01 (cf. Yonelinas & Ja-
coby, 1996). The target completion data for the PDP groups appear in Table 3.
As expected, the inclusion group completed more stems with targets than did the
Table 2
Target completion rates for the implicit and speeded response groups in Experiments 1, 1A, and 2 as a
function of encoding task
Group Encoding task
Semantic Nonsemantic Nonstudied
Expt. 1 Implicit 0.40 0.27 0.13
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Speeded 0.37 0.28 0.14
Response (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Expt. 1A Implicit 0.39 0.27 0.14
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Speeded 0.36 0.29 0.12
Response (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Expt. 2 Implicit 0.62 0.57 0.39
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Speeded 0.61 0.58 0.38
Response (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3
Inclusion and exclusion scores, plus conscious and automatic estimates from the PDP groups, in
Experiments 1, 1A, and 2 as a function of encoding task
Measure Model assumption Encoding task
Semantic Nonsemantic





Automatic Independence 0.14 0.21
Redundancy 0.54 0.36





Automatic Independence 0.12 0.21
Redundancy 0.50 0.32





Automatic Independence 0.65 0.60
Redundancy 0.69 0.61
Automatic estimates are shown for the independence and redundancy assumptions. Conscious estimates
are the same across the two model assumptions. Standard errors in parentheses.
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F(1,22) = 1.52, MSE = 0.02, however, there was a substantial interaction of group
by depth, F(1,22) = 14.37, indicating that semantically encoded items were more
accurately included by the inclusion group and were more accurately excluded by
the exclusion group, than were nonsemantically encoded items.
We derived estimates of conscious and automatic retrieval from the PDP groups
using the independence assumption (Buchner et al., 1995),
C ¼ I  E
A ¼ Eð1 CÞ
where I and E refer to target completion rates on the inclusion and exclusion tasks,
respectively. The estimate of the variance of the sampling distribution for automatic
retrieval when inclusion and exclusion tasks are manipulated between subjects was
based on Horton and Vaughan (1999).1 Conscious estimates were higher following
the semantic task than following the nonsemantic task, t(22) = 2.65, SEM = 0.10,
but automatic estimates based on the independence assumption did not show a depth
effect, t(22) < 1, SEM = 0.09. These findings parallel those reported previously (Jaco-
by et al., 1993; but see Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998).
The independence relationship adopted by the PDP model is only one possible
relationship between automatic and conscious processes. Joordens and Merikle
(1993; Curran & Hintzman, 1995; see also Bodner et al., 2000; Wilson & Horton,
2002) offered arguments for a redundancy assumption which specifies that, ‘‘when-
ever a conscious influence is present, there is also a correlated unconscious influence’’
(Joordens & Merikle, 1993, p. 464). Calculation of the conscious influence remains
unchanged with this assumption (Buchner et al., 1995), however, automatic influ-
ences are equated with performance on the inclusion test. Automatic estimates based
on the redundancy assumption were reliably higher in the semantic than in the non-
semantic condition, t(22) = 2.47, SEM = 0.07. Thus, the independence assumption
leads to the conclusion that the automatic estimate was not affected by depth of pro-
cessing, although it yielded a numerically higher estimate in the nonsemantic condi-
tion. By contrast, the redundancy model revealed a reliably higher automatic
estimate in the semantic condition (see also Hirshman et al., 2003).1 The derivation of the estimate of the variance of the sampling distribution of ratios is based on
Cochrane (1977) and Stuart and Ord (1987), and is detailed in Horton and Vaughan (1999). The estimates




















where A and C refer to the automatic and conscious estimates and I and E refer to inclusion and exclusion
scores.
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In the final analyses, we compared estimates of automatic retrieval from the
speeded response group with those from the inclusion and exclusion groups using
each retrieval assumption (independence, redundancy). Baselines were not sub-
tracted in these analyses, following the convention for deriving these estimates.
For the independence model, the analysis included data for 24 subjects in the
speeded response group and for 12 subjects in each of the inclusion and exclusion
groups. For the redundancy model, the analysis included data for 24 subjects in
the speeded response group and 12 subjects in the inclusion group.
Using the independence assumption, the speeded response group provided a reli-
ably higher estimate of automatic retrieval than did the PDP groups for semantically
encoded items, t(46) = 3.31, SEM = 0.07. Using the redundancy assumption, the
PDP groups yielded a higher estimate of automatic retrieval in the semantic condi-
tion than did the speeded response group, t(34) = 2.36, SEM = 0.07, but estimates of
automatic retrieval in the nonsemantic conditions did not differ regardless of
whether independence or redundancy was assumed, ts = 0.91 and 1.18, SEMs = 0.08
and 0.07, respectively. It is notable that, in the nonsemantic as in the semantic con-
dition, the pattern of data indicated that the independence assumption underesti-
mated automatic retrieval relative to the speeded response group whereas the
redundancy assumption yielded an overestimate, although none of the differences
for the nonsemantic condition were reliable (see also Horton et al., 2001).
2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 provided a comparison of automatic estimates following a depth of
processing manipulation. The results of the study are straightforward. First, the RT
data from the speeded response group replicated those of Horton et al. (2001) in
showing no evidence of subjects switching to a conscious retrieval strategy when
stems of studied words were presented on the critical stem completion test. The pat-
tern of RTs did not change from the practice tests to the critical test, consistent with
the conclusion that subjects relied on automatic retrieval for the critical test, rather
than switching to conscious retrieval.
Target completion rates and depth of processing effects in the implicit and speeded
response groups were identical, suggesting that the implicit group also relied on
automatic retrieval to perform the implicit task. Although depth effects on implicit
memory tasks have been interpreted as evidence of contamination by conscious
retrieval (Jacoby et al., 1993; Jenkins, Russo, & Parkin, 1998; Toth, Reingold, &
Jacoby, 1994), the present findings suggest that these effects may be mediated entirely
by automatic retrieval.
Notably, the PDP estimates of automatic retrieval using the independence assump-
tion underestimated those provided by the speeded response and implicit groups, at
least in the semantic encoding condition. These findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that automatic and conscious retrieval are correlated rather than indepen-
dent processes (Curran & Hintzman, 1995, 1997). Assuming that the speeded re-
sponse group provided estimates of A through their responses on the critical test
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mates provided by the PDP groups suggest that AjC < A, necessitating that
AjC < AjC. Given that C is greater for items encoded semantically versus nonseman-
tically, this also accounts for the finding that the estimate of A derived from the
speeded response group is reliably larger than that from the PDP groups in the seman-
tic condition, but not in the nonsemantic condition (see also Wilson & Horton, 2002).
A followup experiment was designed to achieve a more statistically powerful test of
these ideas. We only briefly summarize this experiment here as it largely replicates the
procedure of Experiment 1. We reduced the number of practice tests in this followup
study to two (16 and 32 items, respectively). Sixteen subjects were tested in each of
three groups (implicit, inclusion, exclusion) and 32 subjects were tested in the speeded
response group. In all other regards, the experiment was identical to Experiment 1.
The RT data for this experiment (Experiment 1A) appear in Table 1. The target com-
pletion data and PDP estimates appear in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The results of
the experiment confirmed each of the effects found in Experiment 1, including no
change in the pattern of RTs from the practice tests to the critical test in the speeded
response group (power > 0.99 to detect a 744 ms difference between the second prac-
tice test and the nonstudied items on the critical test, d = 3.78). In addition, target
completion rates did not differ between the implicit and speeded response groups.
The power of a 2-tailed test (a = 0.05) to detect a difference between these two groups
that was as large as the difference in target completion rates between the implicit and
inclusion groups (0.08; n 0 = 21, d = 0.537) was .66. Combining the data from Exper-
iments 1 and 1A provided a much stronger test: The power to detect a difference as
large as that between the implicit and inclusion groups (0.096; n 0 = 37, d = 0.641)
was 0.97, although there was no effect, F < 1. As in Experiment 1, the indepen-
dence-based PDP groups yielded a large underestimate of automatic retrieval in the
semantic condition relative to the speeded response group, although this effect was
not evident in the automatic estimates in the nonsemantic condition. In addition,
the depth effects reported above were replicated.3. Experiment 2
A potentially important concern from the results of Experiment 1 is that a rela-
tively large number of subjects performed perfectly on the exclusion task, particu-
larly in the semantic encoding condition. This ‘‘exclusion = 0 problem’’ (E = 0)
(Curran & Hintzman, 1995) has been identified as a potential problem in that esti-
mates of A (and C) may reflect floor effects rather than legitimate effects of variables
(Curran & Hintzman, 1997; Jacoby, 1998; Jacoby et al., 1997). Although the PDP
conditions in Experiment 1 replicated the lack of effect of the depth of processing
manipulation reported previously (Jacoby et al., 1993; Toth et al., 1994), the lower
estimates of A in these conditions relative to the speeded response group may be
the result of a relatively large percentage of E = 0 scores in our exclusion group.
In order to minimize the number of E = 0 scores, we replicated Experiment 1
using materials with a higher baseline and in all other regards we followed the
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elected not to use the materials recommended by Jacoby because subjects are re-
stricted to 5-letter responses. Our speeded response procedure does not lend itself
to this restriction because quickly coming up with a 5-letter response would be extre-
mely difficult for at least some items, most notably those with very high normative
baseline rates. The risk, then, would be that subjects would sacrifice speed, and per-
haps switch to a conscious retrieval strategy, thereby offsetting the benefits of our
procedure (Horton et al., 2001). We followed the recommendation of a longer study
list (68 words vs. 32 words in Experiment 1) and a longer test list (90 stems vs. 48
stems). Each was expected to help reduce the number of E = 0 scores. We presented
just one practice test of 30 nonstudied stems to the speeded response group because
of limitations on the pool of items.
Two other issues were also addressed in Experiment 2. First, the trend to higher
automatic estimates (based on the independence calculations) in the nonsemantic
condition could be the result of more perceptual processing during the study trial
if this task requires more time to complete than the semantic task. In order to deter-
mine if study time differences exist between the two tasks, we measured how long
subjects required to complete each task.
Second, subjects in the nonsemantic condition may have failed to complete lex-
ical analysis of every item (Lee, 2002; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998; Wel-
don, 1991), which could account for the lower target completion rate in the
nonsemantic condition in the implicit and speeded response groups. That target
completion rates in the nonsemantic condition were measurably above baseline
could be due to lexical processing of some of these items. Therefore, in Experiment
2, subjects verbalized all items during the study trial, a strategy that has been used in




A total of 89 university undergraduates participated for credit in an Introductory
Psychology course. None of the students had previously participated in a similar
study. Twenty-two students were randomly assigned to each group, except that
the exclusion group included 23.
3.1.2. Design
The design was a 4 · 2 · 4 mixed factorial, with group (implicit, speeded response,
inclusion, exclusion) as the between-subjects variable, and depth of processing
(semantic, nonsemantic) and test (practice test, critical test) as within-subjects
variables.
3.1.3. Materials
The critical stimuli were 120 words from a normative sample collected in our lab.
The stems for these words yielded target completion rates varying from 0.27 to 0.70
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were selected for buffer items on the study trial.
For the study trial, 60 words were randomly selected from the original pool of 120
words. Subjects saw 30 words in each of the semantic and nonsemantic conditions,
presented in randomized blocks. Four buffer items (two semantic, two nonsemantic)
were presented at the beginning and end of the study list. Thus, a total of 68 items
were presented in the study list. For the critical test, participants were exposed to the
stems for all 60 critical items along with stems of 30 randomly selected nonstudied
words. Subjects in the speeded response group were presented the stems from the
remaining 30 words on the practice test.
3.1.4. Procedure
The procedure for the study trial was very similar to that of Experiment 1 in terms
of instructions, screen display, and timing of events. The notable differences were
that subjects verbalized the word on the screen prior to giving their response to
the semantic or nonsemantic task, and subjects verbalized their response to the
encoding task prior to entering a response on the keyboard.
Following the study phase, subjects in the implicit, inclusion, and exclusion
groups completed a filler task and then completed the critical stem completion test
under the same conditions as the corresponding groups in Experiment 1. Subjects
in the speeded response group were given one practice stem completion test of 30
stems followed by the critical test. The remaining features of the stem completion
task replicated those of Experiment 1 except that all groups entered their responses
on the keyboard after verbalizing their response. Responses were tape recorded for
comparison to the typed responses.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Response times
The first analysis addressed the role of study time on automatic estimates. In
Experiment 1, the higher automatic estimates in the nonsemantic than in the seman-
tic condition for the PDP groups could be the result of longer exposure to the stim-
ulus in the nonsemantic task, thereby enhancing the perceptual processing that
supports priming in the stem completion task (Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler,
1992). The analysis included data for all four groups. Median RTs were significantly
longer in the semantic than in the nonsemantic condition (2586 vs. 1662 ms, respec-
tively), F(1,85) = 81.96, MSE = 463,342, but there was no effect of either group or
the interaction, both Fs < 1. Thus, greater exposure time to items in the nonsemantic
condition cannot account for higher automatic estimates in this condition.
Median RTs for the speeded response group were faster on the baseline items of
the critical test than on the practice trial, F(1,21) = 14.14, MSE = 25,336. Thus, there
was no evidence that this group switched to a conscious retrieval strategy on the crit-
ical test. The data appear in Table 1.
Analysis of median RTs to stems for which subjects in the speeded response
group generated the target item on the critical test revealed no depth effect, F < 1,
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correct responses for each subject in each of the semantic and nonsemantic conditions.
3.2.2. Stem completion
The speeded response and implicit groups did not differ in the proportion of base-
line items completed with targets on the critical test, F < 1. The baseline rate of com-
pletion with the target response was approximately 0.38 for both groups, indicating
that the new materials had the desired effect of raising baselines to the level used by
other researchers (Jacoby, 1998).
Analysis of target completion rates for the speeded response and implicit groups
revealed a small but reliable depth of processing effect, F(1,42) = 5.76, MSE = 0.01,
but no effect of group or the interaction of group · depth of processing, both Fs < 1.
The reduced depth effect, compared to Experiment 1, is most likely due to requiring
lexical analysis of the study word (Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998).
3.2.3. Analysis of PDP group data
Baseline rates did not differ in the inclusion and exclusion groups (0.37 and 0.32),
F(1,43) = 2.69, MSE = 0.01. The inclusion group completed more stems with targets
than did the exclusion group, F(1,43) = 14.55, MSE = 0.08. Neither the depth effect,
F(1,43) = 2.09, MSE = 0.01, nor the interaction of group by depth was reliable,
F(1,43) = 1.39. The lack of depth effect and the lack of an interaction of group ·
depth are likely also attributable to the lexical analysis required to verbalize the
study words. When verbalization is not required, as in Experiment 1 and in Toth
et al. (1994, Experiment 1), depth effects occur on inclusion and exclusion tasks.
The key purpose of using a different set of materials in Experiment 2 was to min-
imize the number of subjects with E = 0 scores. In Experiment 2, only 2 of 23 sub-
jects obtained E = 0 scores and none had perfect inclusion scores.
Conscious and automatic estimates in the PDP group were derived using the inde-
pendence and redundancy assumptions. Conscious estimates yielded a reliable depth
effect, t(41) = 2.48, SEM = 0.02, as did automatic estimates based on the indepen-
dence assumption, t(41) = 4.51, SEM = 0.01. A larger numerical difference in auto-
matic estimates based on the redundancy assumption was offset by greater
variability, resulting in no depth effect, t(41) = 1.82, SEM = 0.03. Conscious esti-
mates in Experiment 2 replicated the depth effect reported in Experiment 1, although
the magnitude of the effect was much smaller due to the much lower conscious esti-
mate in the semantic condition. The pattern of the automatic estimates deviated
from that in Experiment 1 where estimates based on the independence assumption
revealed no depth effect but estimates based on the redundancy assumption did re-
veal a depth effect. The markedly higher automatic estimates in Experiment 2 com-
pared to Experiment 1 are attributable to the higher baseline rates in Experiment 2.
3.2.4. Comparison of speeded response and PDP groups
Analyses of the automatic estimates based on the independence assumption indi-
cated no difference between the speeded response and PDP groups on semantic or
nonsemantic items, ts(42) = 1.22 and 1.64, SEMs = 0.03 and 0.02, respectively.
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indicated no difference between groups on semantic or nonsemantic items,
ts(42) = 1.50 and 1.32, SEMs = 0.04 and 0.03, respectively.
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to resolve three issues. First, the higher automatic esti-
mates observed in the nonsemantic condition in Experiment 1 could be due to sub-
jects spending more time completing this task than the semantic task. Using exactly
the same tasks (albeit with the additional requirement of verbalizing the study word),
Experiment 2 showed that the task of counting consonants actually took less time
than generating associates. Therefore the higher automatic estimates observed in
the nonsemantic condition in the PDP groups of Experiment 1 cannot be attributed
to longer exposure to the study word.
A second issue was whether the depth effect observed in the target completion
rates for the speeded response and implicit groups could be attributed to a failure
to complete lexical processing of at least some study words in the nonsemantic con-
dition (Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998). Experiment 2 provided support for
this hypothesis, as the depth effect was markedly reduced when lexical processing
was required of all words. Nonetheless, a small but reliable depth effect remained
in the target completion rates, suggesting that deficits in lexical processing do not
fully account for depth effects in automatic estimates. Richardson-Klavehn and
Gardiner required subjects to complete a lexical decision task on each studied item
(some word-like nonwords were included in the study list) and found no depth effect
in target completion rates. The additional requirement of the lexical decision task,
beyond simple identification of the word, may offset the depth effect on the stem
completion test.
By selecting items with a higher baseline, we substantially reduced the number of
subjects with E = 0 scores in the exclusion group, compared to Experiment 1. Other
effects of the higher baseline were as expected. In the speeded response and implicit
groups, target completion rates increased in the two study conditions, and all were
well above baseline. Some of the increase in the nonsemantic condition was likely
due to the lexical processing requirement. In addition, target completion rates were
higher in the inclusion group and markedly higher in the exclusion group. The latter
reflected strictly the increase in baseline as these target completion rates were only
minimally above baseline, replicating the pattern reported in Experiment 1.
The differential effect of the change in materials on the inclusion and exclusion
data had predictable effects on conscious and automatic estimates. Conscious esti-
mates declined substantially in the semantic condition, relative to Experiments 1
and 1a, as would be expected with the longer study and test lists used in Experiment
2. In the nonsemantic condition, there was little effect of the change of materials on
conscious estimates. The advantage of the lexical processing carried out on the study
trial may have been offset in this condition by the longer study and test lists.
In contrast to the effect on conscious estimates, automatic estimates increased
relative to those in Experiment 1, and more so for calculations based on the
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effect of lower conscious estimates on automatic estimates is predictable if conscious
and automatic retrieval are correlated processes. Based on the equation
A ¼ ðAjCÞC þ ðAjCÞC
Wilson and Horton (2002) noted that as conscious estimates decrease, automatic
estimates derived from the independence assumption will increasingly approximate
the unconditional probability A because the latter will increasingly be weighted as
the conditional probability AjC. Our data show this relationship: Conscious esti-
mates decreased, relative to Experiment 1, and automatic estimates derived from
the independence calculations based on the inclusion and exclusion groups were vir-
tually identical to those from the speeded response groups in both the semantic and
nonsemantic conditions. Further, automatic estimates based on the redundancy
model were virtually identical to those based on the independence model. Overall,
this pattern suggests that conscious and automatic retrieval are correlated processes.4. Experiment 3
The third experiment provided a further comparison of measures of automatic re-
trieval. Jacoby et al. (1993; Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1998) found that full
versus divided attention at study had no impact on automatic estimates, although
there was a substantial effect of this manipulation on conscious estimates (see also
Schmitter-Edgecombe, 1999). It seems possible, however, that dividing attention at
study reduces encoding of information that supports automatic as well as conscious
retrieval (see also Joordens & Merikle, 1993). This would be expected if automatic
and conscious retrieval are correlated processes, as suggested by our previous find-
ings and those of other researchers (e.g., Bodner et al., 2000; Curran & Hintzman,
1995).
There is abundant evidence that performance on most perceptual implicit memory
tests is not impaired by dividing attention, although there are exceptions to this pat-
tern (see Mulligan, 1998, for a summary). For the stem completion test, however, the
limited evidence is equivocal (Clarys, Isingrini, & Haerty, 2000; Gabrieli et al., 1996,
cited in Mulligan, 1998; Schmitter-Edgecombe, 1999), although the finding of an
attention effect may be related to the difficulty of the secondary task (Wolters & Prin-
sen, 1997). However, our interest is in whether, under conditions of full and divided
attention, the speeded response group would provide an estimate of automatic retrie-




A total of 96 university undergraduates participated either for bonus credit in
their Introductory Psychology course or for $6. None of the students had previously
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of the four groups and tested individually.
4.1.2. Design
The design was a 4 · 2 · 4 mixed factorial, with group (implicit, speeded response,
inclusion, exclusion) as the between-subjects variable, and attention at study (full,
divided) and test (3 practice tests, critical test) as within-subjects variables.
4.1.3. Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1 with the fol-
lowing exceptions. First, the study trial was presented as two distinct lists from the
subjects perspective, with full and divided attention conditions assigned equally
often to the first and second lists. Items were counterbalanced across the attention
manipulation. Second, because of the separation of the two attention conditions,
12 words were used as study buffers, with 3 at the beginning and 3 at the end of each
list. Third, a list of single-digit numbers was digitized for auditory presentation. This
list contained approximately 60% odd numbers. In the divided attention condition,
the numbers were presented in random order at a 1 s rate, with two numbers pre-
sented prior to the first study word and two numbers presented after the last study
word. The subjects task was to read the words while simultaneously attempting to
identify sequences of three consecutive odd numbers. In the full attention condition,
subjects were instructed to read the words without the distraction of the numbers.
Words were presented at a 3 s rate.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Response times
Response times for nonstudied items in the speeded response group on each of
the four stem completion tests appear in Table 1. Analyses indicated that RTs var-
ied over tests, F(3,69) = 9.44, MSE = 9564. The RTs on the first test were signifi-
cantly longer than those on each subsequent test (LSD = 56 ms). Further analysis
of RTs on the final practice test and the nonstudied items on the critical test yielded
an effect that approached significance, t(23) = 1.98, SEM = 19.88, but the effect is in
the opposite direction to that anticipated if subjects switched to a conscious retrieval
strategy. Assuming a difference of 744 ms, as in Experiment 1, the power to detect a
reliable increase in RTs is greater than 0.99 (d = 5.40). A difference of 128 ms is re-
quired to satisfy the minimum requirements for a large effect (d = 0.8). Thus, con-
sistent with the results of Experiment 1, RTs showed no evidence that subjects in
the speeded response group switched to a conscious retrieval strategy on the critical
test.
An analysis was conducted on RTs for only those stems to which the subject gen-
erated the target word on the critical test. Three subjects were deleted from this anal-
ysis because they failed to generate at least two target items on the critical test in each
encoding condition. The analysis revealed a reliable effect of study condition,
F(2,40) = 6.15, MSE = 6450, with faster RTs for items in the full attention
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condition (LSD = 54 ms). The latter two conditions did not differ reliably. The rel-
ative instability of these data suggest caution in interpreting these data.
4.2.2. Stem completion
Target completion and baseline data for the implicit and speeded response groups
appear in Table 4. Analysis of the baseline data revealed no difference between these
two groups, F < 1.
Analysis of the target completion data revealed no difference between the implicit
and speeded response groups, F(1,46) = 1.17, MSE = 0.02, and no interaction of
group · study task, F < 1. The power of a 2-tailed test (a = 0.05) to detect a difference
between the implicit and speeded response groups as large as the difference in target
completion rates between the implicit and inclusion groups (0.10; n 0 = 24, d = 0.694)
was 0.87. The target completion rate was greater in the full than in the divided atten-
tion condition, F(1,46) = 24.30, MSE = 0.02, consistent with the hypothesis that the
full attention condition provided more information that was both available and use-
able on the stem completion test than did the divided attention condition.
4.2.3. Analysis of PDP group data
The data for the PDP groups appear in Table 5. The baseline scores of the inclu-
sion (0.15) and exclusion (0.12) groups did not differ reliably, F(1,46) = 1.63,
MSE = 0.01. Dividing attention resulted in a large reduction in the number of targets
produced by the inclusion group and no difference in the number of targets produced
by the exclusion group. There was a significant effect of group, F(1,46) = 48.48,
MSE = 0.02, a significant effect of full versus divided attention, F(1,46) = 11.56,
MSE = 0.02, and a reliable interaction, F(1,46) = 15.04.
Four of the 24 subjects in the exclusion group had perfect scores (E = 0). Analysis
of the conscious estimates for the PDP groups revealed a reliable advantage of full
versus divided attention, t(46) = 2.48, SEM = 0.09. Automatic estimates did not dif-
fer for full and divided attention conditions when calculated based on the indepen-
dence assumption, t(46) = 1.37, SEM = 0.04, however, there was a reliable advantage
for the full attention condition when automatic estimates were based on the redun-
dancy assumption, t(46) = 2.99, SEM = 0.07. The results based on the independenceTable 4
Target completion rates for the implicit and speeded response groups in Experiment 3 as a function of
attention condition at study
Group Attention
Full Divided Baseline
Implicit 0.40 0.25 0.13
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Speeded 0.42 0.30 0.13
Response (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5
Inclusion and exclusion scores, and conscious and automatic estimates from the PDP groups, in
Experiment 3 as a function of full versus divided attention at study







Automatic Independence 0.29 0.23
Redundancy 0.54 0.32
Automatic estimates are shown for the independence and redundancy assumptions. Conscious estimates
are the same across the two model assumptions. Standard errors in parentheses.
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et al., 1993; Schmitter-Edgecombe, 1999; Wolters & Prinsen, 1997).
4.2.4. Comparison of speeded response and PDP groups
For the full attention condition, the speeded response group yielded higher auto-
matic estimates than did the PDP groups based on the independence assumption,
t(70) = 2.31, SEM = 0.06. Using the redundancy assumption, the automatic estimate
from the PDP groups was numerically, but not reliably, larger than the estimate
from the speeded response group, t(46) = 1.48, SEM = 0.08. For the divided atten-
tion condition, there was no reliable difference in the automatic estimates between
the speeded response group and the PDP groups when the automatic estimates in
the latter group were based on independence, t(70) = 1.52, SEM = 0.05, or redun-
dancy, t(46) = 0.40, SEM = 0.05.
4.3. Discussion
The RT data indicated that the speeded response group did not change to a con-
scious retrieval strategy on the critical test. Also, both the speeded response and the
implicit groups showed greater priming under full than divided attention. This effect
was equivalent in the two groups, suggesting that the implicit group employed
strictly automatic retrieval to complete stems on the critical test.
Whereas the effects of full and divided attention on the PDP estimates of con-
scious and automatic retrieval parallelled those of previous studies (Debner &
Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby et al., 1993; Schmitter-Edgecombe, 1999; Wolters & Prinsen,
1997), the automatic estimates from our PDP groups were reliably lower than those
from the speeded response group in the full attention condition. By contrast, under
conditions that allowed for relatively little conscious retrieval, namely divided atten-
tion at study, the PDP estimates of automatic retrieval were similar to those derived
from the speeded response group (Wilson & Horton, 2002).
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iment 2. We briefly consider these here in the context of Experiment 3. First, unlike
in Experiment 1, differential exposure to stimuli at study was not an issue in Exper-
iment 3 as study words were presented for a fixed interval in both conditions. Sec-
ond, as Experiments 1 and 3 were conducted at the same time, we did not require
verbalization of study words in Experiment 3 either, and therefore we cannot con-
firm that subjects completed sufficient lexical processing of every study word to sup-
port automatic retrieval. However, subjects in Experiment 3 were instructed to read
the words (not overtly) rather than perform a nonsemantic encoding task that might
induce them to focus on only certain letters rather than the entire lexical unit. Final-
ly, the number of E = 0 scores was not a serious concern in this experiment as only
four exclusion subjects provided perfect scores. Analysis of the data with and with-
out these four subjects yielded the same statistical outcomes.5. General discussion
5.1. Evidence for automatic retrieval
Previous attempts to isolate automatic retrieval have met with various criticisms.
Horton et al. (2001) and Wilson and Horton (2002) compared performance of a
speeded response group with those of both an explicit group given explicit retrieval
instructions and a baseline group in which no critical stems could be completed with
studied items. The time to generate completions on the critical stem completion test
was reliably greater in the explicit group than in either the speeded response or the
baseline groups, which did not differ. The longer RTs in the explicit group than in the
baseline group confirm that conscious retrieval takes longer to complete than auto-
matic retrieval (Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995, 1998). The RTs in the
speeded response group were equivalent to those in the baseline group and faster
than those in the explicit group, indicating that the speeded response group did
not switch to a conscious retrieval strategy when presented stems of previously stud-
ied items (Richardson-Klavehn, Clarke, & Gardiner, 1999; Richardson-Klavehn &
Gardiner, 1998). The RT data from all three experiments reported here lead to ex-
actly the same conclusion.
In drawing this conclusion, it is useful to identify exactly how we define automatic
retrieval. We have suggested previously (Horton et al., 2001) that our interpretation
of automatic retrieval would allow us to use the label unintentional retrieval because
we focus on the nature of the cognitive operations that subjects enlist for completing
the task. We restrict our operational definition of conscious and automatic retrieval
more generally to one of intent: When subjects are not attempting to actively use pre-
viously studied information to complete the task, then retrieval is deemed automatic.
Automatic retrieval likely establishes a substantial substrate of information upon
which conscious retrieval processes operate. Thus, even when we make a conscious
attempt at retrieval of a previously studied event, automatic processes likely contrib-
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information about the targeted event (Horton et al., 2001).
This definition has a number of implications. First, speed of responding is not a
theoretical requirement for establishing the use of automatic retrieval: Rather, auto-
matic retrieval is an integral component of conscious retrieval rather than seques-
tered from it. Nonetheless, the value of our speeded response task is that it allows
us to exclude the use of conscious retrieval, as indicated by the RT data we have re-
ported here and elsewhere. Second, this definition is silent in terms of the occurrence
of unintentional conscious awareness (e.g., Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1996) follow-
ing automatic retrieval. Although most if not all automatic processes may be trans-
parent and inaccessible to awareness, the products of those automatic processes may
normally be fully accessible to awareness. Indeed, our definition requires the latter
conclusion if in fact automatic processes are integral to conscious (or intentional) re-
trieval. For example, no matter what conscious processes we invoke, we may not be
able to access the underlying processes and information database that allow us to
identify whether an item was previously studied, any more than it is possible to con-
sciously identify the information used to remember the names of our siblings, or the
capital of France. Whether we are confident about the episodic history of an item or
not, the event either has a sense of familiarity to it (perhaps because we can remem-
ber details or it just ‘‘feels’’ familiar) or it does not: What leads to that sense of famil-
iarity may be outside of our conscious grasp.
5.2. Comparisons of automatic estimates
With evidence that our speeded response group provides a relatively pure measure
of automatic retrieval, we compared target completion rates on this task with those
from a standard implicit memory task and with automatic estimates from a PDP
task. The results were consistent in showing that the implicit group provided an
accurate estimate of automatic retrieval: There were no differences in target comple-
tion rates for the implicit and speeded response groups (see also Horton et al., 2001;
Vonk & Horton, in press; Wilson & Horton, 2002). These findings suggest that, with-
in the parameters of our procedure, implicit instructions on the stem completion task
may normally be sufficient to avoid contamination with conscious retrieval, at least
with stems that are readily completed with several very familiar responses. As most
implicit memory studies with the stem completion task use stems with these charac-
teristics, we suggest that performance in those studies plausibly reflects the effects of
pure automatic retrieval (Moscovitch, Goshen-Gottstein, & Vriezen, 1994). How-
ever, stems with fewer and less accessible completions, or implicit tasks that involve
more problem solving strategies (e.g., fragment completion—Mandler, 1991), may
yield a different pattern of target completion if a conscious retrieval strategy becomes
more efficient compared to a pure automatic retrieval strategy. Together, these con-
clusions suggest that the focus of the retrieval intentionality criterion (Schacter et al.,
1989) on implicit versus explicit instructions will sometimes, but not always, permit a
distinction between the use of automatic and conscious retrieval processes.
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task yielded a different pattern. In conditions that allowed for greater conscious re-
trieval (semantic encoding in Experiment 1, full attention in Experiment 3), estimates
of automatic retrieval were reliably lower in the PDP task than in the speeded re-
sponse task (Wilson & Horton, 2002). In conditions that spawned lower conscious
retrieval (nonsemantic encoding in Experiment 1, long study and test lists in Exper-
iment 2, divided attention in Experiment 3), estimates of automatic retrieval did not
differ between the two measures. A target completion rate below baseline was evident
in the semantic condition of Experiment 1. This is acknowledged as a signature of a
generate/recognize strategy (Bodner et al., 2000) in which subjects do not adopt di-
rect retrieval but rather first use the test cue to generate response alternatives and
then use a recognition process to select studied items from the generated alternatives.
This strategy implies redundancy rather than independence as all conscious recogni-
tion decisions are based on automatically generated response alternatives. Notably,
this pattern was not evident in Experiment 3. Nonetheless, the pattern of conscious
and automatic estimates in the PDP groups was identical across experiments.
The comparison of automatic estimates from the speeded response group with
those from the PDP procedure yielded results that were consistent with the hypoth-
esis that automatic and conscious retrieval are positively correlated. Estimates of
automatic retrieval based on PDP were similar to those from the speeded response
group when C was relatively low, specifically when subjects engaged in a nonseman-
tic orienting task (with shorter lists) or a divided attention task. By contrast, when C
was relatively high, such as when subjects engaged in a semantic orienting task or
studied under conditions of full attention, PDP tended to underestimate automatic
retrieval (see also Bodner et al., 2000; Russo et al., 1998; Wilson & Horton, 2002).
However, these data do not provide an unequivocal test of the independence
assumption that is central to PDP.
The PDP makes the further assumption that awareness of the episodic history of a
retrieved item maps uniquely onto conscious retrieval processes (Kinoshita, 2001;
Reingold & Toth, 1996). If this ‘‘awareness assumption’’ (Horton et al., 2001) is
incorrect, such that the episodic history of retrieved items can be obtained through
automatic retrieval (Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, &
Java, 1994, 1996, 1999), it would still be possible, in principle, for the two retrieval
processes to be independent. However, when assuming independence, violation of
the awareness assumption will result in an underestimation of A (and an overestima-
tion of C).
An alternative interpretation of performance on the inclusion and exclusion tasks
is that subjects engage in a generate/recognize rather than a direct retrieval strategy.
Bodner et al. (2000) have shown that the ‘‘signatures’’ of a generate/recognize strat-
egy need not be present, even when subjects are given generate/recognize instruc-
tions. Indeed, they reported data from this condition that mimicked performance
under direct retrieval instructions. However, since a generate/recognize strategy as-
sumes the version of the redundancy model that we have adopted here, our data
are not entirely supportive of this interpretation: Estimates of automatic retrieval
based on the redundancy assumption were somewhat higher than those from the
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ness. This implies that subjects in the inclusion and exclusion groups were able to use
conscious awareness to enhance performance beyond that provided by automatic
retrieval.2
We add one qualification to this conclusion that there is not strong evidence of a
generate/recognize strategy in the inclusion and exclusion tests. Such a strategy sug-
gests an iterative process of identifying potential targets followed by a recognition
check on each generated item. However, the speeded response group was asked to
provide just the first item that came to mind. Thus, we may not have exhausted
the potential output of automatic retrieval processes as might occur when subjects
are encouraged to repeat the generation process until they come up with a target
or they reach their self-defined criterion for terminating the search.3
Although other interpretations are possible, our data and those of Jacoby (1998)
are consistent with this type of iterative generate/recognize strategy. Horton et al.
(2001) reported that the explicit group completed more stems with studied items
in the semantic encoding condition than did the speeded response group. Similarly,
when Jacobys (1998) direct retrieval group performed an inclusion task following a
full attention study task, they too completed more stems with targets than did the
generate/recognize group who simply generated the first word that came to mind.
If our explicit instructions and Jacobys direct retrieval instructions induced an iter-
ative generate/recognize strategy (not an unreasonable assumption given that the
goal of both groups is to output a studied word), then the higher target completion
rate in these groups compared to groups asked to use the first word that comes to
mind (our speeded response group, Jacobys generate/recognize inclusion group) is
readily explained. This finding should occur whenever subjects can consciously iden-
tify at least some targets and the probability of generating the target on the first at-
tempt is less than unity. In principle, though, it is still possible that subjects given an
inclusion task under direct retrieval instructions actually engage in direct retrieval as
conceptualized within PDP and that this direct retrieval itself is iterative.
5.3. Criterial task differences
Automatic estimates from the speeded response procedure and from the implicit
memory task consistently differed from those from the PDP conditions, except when
conscious estimates in the PDP conditions were low. Although some of the criticisms
of PDP may ultimately contribute to an explanation for this outcome, we would like2 Mike Masson suggested that the inclusion and exclusion instructions may have induced a generation
strategy that increased the number of studied items that were actually generated, relative to that of the
speeded response group. Weldon and Colston (1995, Experiment 2) showed evidence for such a difference
in a comparison of implicit and explicit instructions on a stem completion test, although under conditions
that appear to more closely resemble those used in our study, this difference was not reliable (Horton et al.,
2001). Our data do not provide a basis for discriminating these alternative interpretations.
3 Another possibility is that the retrieval of multiple items may be simultaneous, or nearly so. However
this would seem to have no net effect on the interpretation, as presumably the conscious process of
evaluating each alternative would still be serial. Again we thank Mike Masson for raising this issue.
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ory tasks, subjects are instructed to respond with the first word that comes to mind.
By contrast, the inclusion and exclusion instructions used in PDP experiments spec-
ify that subjects use the test cue to respond with a studied or a nonstudied word,
respectively. Clearly the criterial task (Jenkins, 1979; see also Bodner et al., 2000:
McBride, Dosher, & Gage, 2001; Snodgrass, 2004; Whittlesea & Price, 2001) differs
in these two situations and this difference might be expected to influence the process-
ing that subjects enlist. Yonelinas (2002) noted that the differential emphasis on
speed could also affect these processes, although we consistently find no differences
in target completion rates between the speeded response procedure and standard im-
plicit tasks. Thus, conclusions about automatic retrieval based on implicit memory
performance and performance on the speeded task may be accurate for this type
of criterial task (no attempt to retrieve studied words) whereas conclusions about
automatic retrieval based on PDP tasks may be accurate for that type of criterial
task (intentional retrieval of studied words) (see Mecklenbräuker, Wippich, & Moh-
rhusen, 1996, for a similar view; see also Jacoby et al., 1993; Neumann, 1984).
Certainly our ideas about the effect of different criterial tasks run counter to the
way some researchers think about automatic processes, namely that they are insen-
sitive to the goals and purposes of the subject (see Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997,
for examples of this view; Kelley & Jacoby, 1998). Is there any evidence that auto-
matic retrieval processes vary across experimental situations? Besner et al. (1997)
provided an example using the Stroop task. When congruent items were eliminated
from the design such that there was no support for engaging in automatic retrieval of
the word itself, interference in the incongruent condition was totally eliminated.
Thus, the way in which subjects approached the test affected automatic retrieval
of the word (see also Besner, 2001).
5.4. Procedural issues
The key feature of the direct retrieval hypothesis is that subjects engage indepen-
dent automatic and conscious retrieval processes simultaneously upon presentation
of the test cue. For this reason, PDP instructions advise subjects to use the test cue to
retrieve a studied item (Jacoby, 1998). However, it is further argued that it is desir-
able to manipulate inclusion and exclusion tests within rather than between subjects
as we have done here (see also Buchner et al., 1995; Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Jaco-
by, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1993; Russo & Andrade, 1995). One reason for this prescrip-
tion is that a within-subjects design may minimize differences in response bias across
tests (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996; but see Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998).
However, a between-subjects design does not de facto produce such changes, as is
evident in the present results. A second reason is that data from a between-subjects
design resist analysis because of the lack of an error term for automatic estimates.
The procedure we have described for estimating the variance of a ratio (Horton &
Vaughan, 1999) resolves this concern. The question remains, then, whether there
are reasons for preferring a within- rather than a between-subjects design for induc-
ing direct retrieval.
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item and then to base their response on the inclusion and exclusion tests on that re-
call (Jacoby, 1998). This appears to be the essential feature of the test instructions for
inducing a direct retrieval strategy. We suggest that the instruction to use the test cue
to ‘‘recall’’ a studied item is as easily incorporated into between- as within-subjects
designs.4 Further, because the between-subjects design does not necessitate discard-
ing data from subjects with exclusion scores of zero, as occurs (sometimes fre-
quently—e.g., Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998) in a within-subjects design,
the former may actually be preferred. As noted by Curran and Hintzman (1995), dis-
carding data from subjects who are very successful at following instructions (i.e.,
excluding all studied items) can be a problem as scores are discarded from one
end of the distribution only. Such a procedure can be expected to introduce a bias
into the estimates of C and A. Thus, there are several reasons why researchers might
opt for a between-subjects manipulation of inclusion and exclusion. It remains to be
seen whether two design alternatives yield comparable results and, if not, the theo-
retical implications of such outcomes.6. Conclusions
The purpose of our research was to compare automatic estimates derived from
our speeded response group with those from an implicit memory group and from
PDP groups. Given the RT evidence supporting the assumption that subjects in
the speeded response group adopted automatic retrieval throughout the test phase,
the finding of identical automatic estimates for the speeded response and implicit
groups suggests that, under our experimental conditions, the implicit group also em-
ployed automatic retrieval. By contrast, the PDP groups consistently revealed under-
estimates of automatic retrieval when conscious retrieval was high but not when
conscious retrieval was comparatively low, suggesting that automatic and conscious
retrieval were positively correlated rather than independent. As a consequence of this
underestimation, results from the PDP groups suggested that neither depth of pro-
cessing nor the attention at study manipulation affected automatic retrieval,
although a small depth effect was found on automatic estimates in Experiment 2.4 The instruction to use the test cue to ‘‘recall’’ a previously presented word appears to be the critical
procedural instantiation of direct retrieval (Jacoby, 1998). Thus these instructions provide the basis for
satisfying ‘‘the assumption that [C] is the same for inclusion and exclusion tests as well as [satisfying] the
independence assumption’’ (Jacoby, 1998, p. 18) and, importantly, for avoiding concerns of subjects
engaging in a generate/recognize strategy. To assume that subjects can and will follow these instructions in
strict accordance with the direct retrieval model seems a weighty assumption indeed (see also Curran &
Hintzman, 1995; Joordens & Merikle, 1993; Russo et al., 1998) and one that requires careful empirical
validation. In one attempt to demonstrate the effects of different instructions, Jacoby (1998, Experiment 1)
compared these recall instructions with ‘‘generate/recognize’’ instructions. However, labelling standard
implicit memory instructions as ‘‘inclusion test instructions’’ and then using the data from this task to
derive estimates of C and A (Jacoby, 1998, Appendix B) does not, in our view, provide a strong basis for
assessing the efficacy of the recall instructions for satisfying the assumptions of PDP.
260 K.D. Horton et al. / Acta Psychologica 119 (2005) 235–263In contrast, automatic estimates derived from the standard and speeded response
tasks showed that both of these manipulations affected automatic retrieval. These
findings suggest caution in interpreting the lack of effect of several variables on esti-
mates automatic retrieval derived from PDP.Acknowledgement
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